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En este trabajo se presenta un modelo dinámico y estocástico de equilibrio general con 
una única fricción en todos los mercados: información pegajosa. Los agentes de esta 
economía son poco informados debido al costo de adquirir, absorber y procesar la 
información, por lo que los consumidores, trabajadores y empresas incorporan 
lentamente las noticias en sus acciones. En este trabajo se presenta los detalles de cómo 
una economía con funciones de desinformación generalizada, y se desarrolla un 
conjunto de algoritmos para dar rápida solución al modelo. Luego se aplican estos para 
estimar el modelo con datos post 1986 para Estados Unidos y post 1993 para la Zona 
Euro, y para realizar experimentos de política contrafactual. El resultado final es un 
laboratorio suficientemente provisto como para representar la dinámica de al menos 
cinco series macroeconómicas (inflación, actividad, horas, tasas de interés y salarios), 






This paper presents a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with a single 
friction in all markets: sticky information. In this economy, agents are inattentive 
because of the high cost of acquiring, absorbing and processing information, so that the 
actions of consumers, workers and firms are slow to incorporate news. This paper 
presents the details of the behavior of an economy with pervasive inattentiveness 
functions, and develops a set of algorithms that solve the model quickly. It then applies 
these to estimate the model using post-1986 data for the United States and post-1993 for 
the Eurozone, and to conduct counterfactual policy experiments. The end result is a 
laboratory that is rich enough to account for the dynamics of at least five 
macroeconomic series (inflation, output, hours, interest rates, and wages), and which 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Following on Keynes’ desire that economists be as useful as dentists, Lucas (1980) argues that 
this would amount to the following: “Our task, as I see it, is to write a FORTRAN program that will 
accept specific economic policy rules as ‘input’ and will generate as ‘output’ statistics describing the 
operating characteristics of time series we care about, which are predicted to result from these 
policies.” Starting with Kydland and Prescott (1982), and with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) in 
the context of monetary policy, the computer program that Lucas asked for has taken the form of 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.1 This paper follows the seminal work of 
Taylor (1979) in using one of these models to ask a series of hypothetical monetary policy questions. 
However, the initial versions of monetary DSGE models suffer from one problem: they imply a 
rapid adjustment of many macroeconomic variables to shocks, while in the data, these responses 
tend to be gradual and delayed. The predictions of the standard classical model regarding 
investment, consumption, real wages, or inflation lack stickiness, to use the term coined by Sims 
(1998) and Mankiw and Reis (2006). The most popular approach for addressing this disconnect 
between theory and data follows the influential work of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) 
by adding many rigidities that stand in the way of adjustment: sticky but indexed prices in goods 
markets, adjustment costs in investment markets, habits in consumption markets, and sticky but 
indexed wages in labor markets. 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing an alternative DSGE model of business 
cycles and monetary policy. The only source of rigidity is inattention in all markets by agents who 
choose to only update their information sporadically in order to save on the fixed costs of acquiring, 
absorbing, and processing information (Reis, 2006a, 2006b). Information is sticky because different 
agents update their information at different dates, so they only gradually learn of news. I call it the 
sticky information in general equilibrium, or SIGE, model. Mankiw and Reis (2006, 2007) provided a 
first glimpse of SIGE, and this paper presents the model and its solution in full. I then proceed to 
estimate it for the United States after 1986 and the euro area after 1993 and to conduct a few policy 
experiments. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model and discusses its current 
limitations. Section 2 log-linearizes the model to arrive at a set of reduced-form relations that 
characterize the equilibrium. Section 3 describes an algorithm to compute a solution and derives 
formulas to calculate the key inputs into estimation (the likelihood function) and policy analysis (a 
social welfare function). Section 4 reviews the literature on estimating models with sticky 
information and describes the approach taken in this paper. Section 5 presents the estimation 
results for the United States and the euro area, while section 6 examines the sensitivity of the 
estimates. Section 7 answers a few policy questions, and section 8 concludes. 
 
2. THE SIGE MODEL 
 
The SIGE model belongs to the wide class of general-equilibrium models with monopolistic 
competition that have become the workhorse for the study of monetary policy (surveyed in Woodford, 
2003b). There are three sets of markets where agents meet every period: markets for different 
varieties of goods, where monopolistic firms sell varieties of goods to households; a market for 
savings, where households trade bonds and interest rates change to balance borrowing and lending; 
and markets for labor, where monopolistic households sell varieties of labor to firms. I present each 
of these markets in turn, before describing the assumptions on information and attention. 
 
2.1 The Goods Market 
 
                                                       
1. These are quickly growing in richness and being used in central banks, including the European Central Bank (Smets 
and Wouters, 2003) and the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve (Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust, 2006), as well as the 
International Monetary Fund (Bayoumi, 2004). 2 
On the buying side, there is a continuum of shoppers indexed by j that consume a continuum of 
varieties of goods in the unit interval indexed by i, denoted by Ct,j(i). A bundle of these varieties of 
goods yields utility according to a Dixit-Stiglitz function with a time-varying and random elasticity of 
substitution  t ν   . Each good trades at price Pt,i and the problem of a shopper with Zt,j to spend that 
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On the selling side of the market, there is a monopolistic firm for each variety of the good. Each 
of these firms, indexed by i, operates a technology that uses labor Nt,i at cost Wt to produce good i 
under diminishing returns to scale with β ∈ (0, 1) and a common technology shock At. The firm’s 
sales department is in charge of setting the price Pt,i and selling the output Yt,i to maximize real 
after-tax profits subject to the technology and the demand for the good:  
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(i)(.) expectations operator of the sales department of firm i depends on its information, 
which I will discuss later. The government intervenes in two ways in the actions of the firm: 
collecting a fixed sales tax, τp, and buying a time-varying and random share, 1 – 1/Gt, of the goods in 
the market. These governmental purchases are wasted, and I refer to them broadly as aggregate 
demand shocks. Aggregate output is 







After some rearranging, the first-order condition from this problem becomes  
                                                       
2. Defining aggregate output as  ( )
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If the firm observed all the variables on the right-hand side, this condition would state that the 
nominal price charged, Pt,i, is equal to a markup, (1 –τp ) t ν   / ( t ν    – 1), stemming from taxes and the 
ability to exploit an elastic demand curve, over nominal marginal costs, which equal the cost of an 
extra unit of labor, Wt, divided by its marginal product, βYt,i / Nt,i. 
 
2.2 The Bond Market 
 
In this market, saver-planners meet each other to trade one-period bonds. Their aim is to 
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where ξ is the discount factor and θ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. They have an 
intertemporal budget constraint:  
 
























The saver-planner j enters the period with real wealth Mt,j, uses some of it to consume, earns 
labor income at the wage rate Wt,j after paying a fixed labor income tax τw, and receives a lump-sum 
transfer Tt,j. The transfer Tt,j includes lump-sum taxes, profits and losses from firms, and payments 
from an insurance contract that all households signed at date 0 that ensures that every period they 
are all left with the same wealth. Savings accumulate at the real interest rate Πt+1, although, in 
equilibrium, bonds are in zero net supply, so savings integrate to zero over all consumers. 
The dynamic program that characterizes the saver-planner’s problem is messy, so it is covered in 
the appendix. If j = 0 denotes the saver-planner that forms expectations rationally based on up-to-
date information, so    Et
(0) = Et , then the optimality conditions are  
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The first equation is the standard Euler equation for a well-informed agent. It states that the 
marginal utility of consuming today is equal to the expected discounted marginal utility of 
consuming tomorrow times the return on savings. The second equation notes that agents who are not 
so well informed set their marginal utility of consumption to what they expect it would be with full 
information. 
The monetary policymaker intervenes in this market by supplying reserves at an interest rate. 
Because these reserves are substitutable with the bonds that consumers trade among themselves, 
the central bank can target a value for the nominal interest rate, it≡log[Et(Πt+1Pt+1/Pt)], standing 
ready to issue as many reserves as necessary to ensure it. Alternatively, one could introduce money 4 
directly as an additive term in the agents’ utility function and then have the central bank control the 
money supply to target an interest rate (see Woodford, 1998, for an elaboration of this point). The 
nominal interest rate follows some policy rule subject to exogenous monetary shocks εt. To fix ideas, 
and because it will be the policy rule used in the estimation, consider a Taylor rule:  
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where  Yt
c  is the level of output in the classical or attentive equilibrium (sometimes called the 
natural output level).  
 
2.3 The Labor Market 
 
This market features workers on the selling side and firms on the buying side. The firms, 
indexed by i, have a purchasing department hiring a continuum of varieties of labor indexed by k in 
the amount Nt,i(k) at price Wt,k and combining them into the labor input Nt,i according to a Dixit-
Stiglitz function with a random and time-varying elasticity of substitution t γ   . The purchasing 
department’s problem is to solve the following problem, given current wages and a total desired 
amount of inputs Nt,i:  
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The solution to this problem is 
   
Nt,i(k)=Nt,i Wt,k /Wt ( ), where WtNt,i =
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static wage index  ( )
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. Aggregating over all firms gives the total demand for 



















Each worker is a monopolistic supplier of a variety of labor. The workers’ aim is to minimize 
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where ξ is the discount factor and ψ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. They face the same 
intertemporal budget constraint as the consumers in equation (9), and they also take into account  
the demand for their good from 




∫ Nt,i(k)di  and equation (14). Aggregate labor employed is 
   
Lt = ∫Lt,kdk .3 The optimality conditions are  
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The first condition is the standard intertemporal labor supply Euler equation for a well-informed 
worker. If  t γ    is fixed, the equation states that the marginal disutility of supplying labor today (




divided by the real wage (Wt,0/Pt) equates the discounted marginal disutility tomorrow (
   
L
t+1,0
1/ψ ) divided 
by the real wage tomorrow (Wt+1,0/Pt+1) times the real interest rate. With time-varying  t γ   , the Euler 
equation takes into account the change in the markup that the monopolistic worker wants to charge. 
The second condition is the counterpart to condition (11) in the consumer problem—for the fully-
informed case Et(k) = Et, it simply states that Wt,k = Wt,0. 
 
2.4 Information, Agents, and Attention 
 
Uncertainty in this economy arises because every period there is a different realization of the 
random variables characterizing productivity (At), aggregate demand (Gt), price and wage markups 
( t ν    and  t γ   ), and monetary policy (εt). 
If all agents are fully informed, then the model described above is a standard classical model. 
While the discussion presented consumers (shoppers and saver-planners) and workers separately, 
they are all members of one household with period preferences  
 















and with j = k since there is common information. The decisions on the consumption of each variety, 
total consumption, and the wage to charge, are all made with rational expectations using all 
available information. Likewise, if the two departments of the firm share their information, they can 
be thought of as a single decisionmaker. 
The SIGE model introduces only one new assumption relative to this classical benchmark: while 
the expectations of each agent are formed rationally, they do not necessarily use all available 
information. More concretely, it assumes that there are fixed costs of acquiring, absorbing, and 
processing information, so that agents optimally choose to only update their information sporadically 
(Reis, 2006a, 2006b). This inattentiveness is present in all of the markets—by the planner-savers in 
the savings market, by the sales departments of firms in the goods markets, and by the workers in 
the labor markets. Separating consumers from workers allows them to potentially update their 
information at different frequencies. In this case, while they share a household, in the sense of a 
                                                       
3. As with output, defining aggregate labor as  ( )










 leads to the same results up to a log-linear 
approximation. 6 
common objective (equation 18) and a common budget constraint (equation 9), they do not 
necessarily need to share information. When workers update their information, they also learn about 
what the consumers have been doing, and vice versa for consumers when they update. 
While inattentiveness occurs in all markets, not all agents in this economy are inattentive. In the 
goods market, the model assumes that the consumer is separated into two units: the saver-planner 
who updates information infrequently and the shopper who knows about the expenditure plan of the 
saver and observes the relative prices of the different goods. This assumption is not implausible: 
while the choice of how much to spend in total and how much to save requires solving an 
intertemporal optimization problem and making forecasts into the infinite future, choosing the 
relative proportion of each good to buy requires only seeing goods’ prices. The main reason to make 
this assumption, though, is a current limitation in our knowledge. If the monopolistic firms in the 
goods’ market faced inattentive shoppers, they would want to exploit them to raise profits, but the 
shoppers would then take this into account in choosing how often to be inattentive. The equilibrium 
of this game has not yet been fully studied, and assuming that shoppers are attentive avoids it 
entirely. The same argument leads to separating the firm into an inattentive sales-production team 
and an attentive purchasing department. 
Within the inattentiveness model, the SIGE model adds an extra restriction: that the stochastic 
process for the expected costs of planning is such that the distribution of inattentiveness for 
consumers, workers, and firms is exponential. Reis (2006b) establishes the strict conditions under 
which this will hold for the firms’ problem. Under these conditions, for a linearized homoskedastic 
economy, the optimal rate of arrival of information is fixed so that it can be treated as a parameter 
(bearing in mind that it maps into the monetary cost of updating information). Therefore, every 
period, a fraction of planner-savers δ updates its information, so there are δ agents who have current 
information, δ(1 – δ) that have one-period-old information, δ(1 – δ)2 with two-period-old information, 
and so on. Because agents only differ on the date at which they last updated, we can group them and 
let j denote how long ago the planner last updated. Likewise, a share λ of firms and ω of workers 
update their information every period, so they can be grouped into groups i of size λ(1 – λ)i and 
groups k of size ω(1 – ω)k, according to how long it has been since they last updated. 
The inattentive equilibrium is defined as follows: the set of aggregate variables {Yt,  Lt}, the 
output of each variety {Yt,i}, the labor of each variety {Lt,j}, the prices of each good {Pt,i}, wages 
{Wt,i}, and interest rates {it}, such that consumers, workers, and firms behave optimally (as 
described above), all markets clear, and monetary policy follows a rule like equation (12), with P–1 = 
0 for all dates t from 0 to infinity as a function of the exogenous paths for technology {At}, monetary 
policy shocks {εt}, aggregate demand {Gt}, goods’ substitutability { t ν   }, and labor substitutability 
{ t γ   }. The classical equilibrium is the equilibrium when δ = λ = ω = 1, so that all agents are attentive. 
 
2.5 Missing Work on the Micro-Foundations of the Model 
 
In the tradition of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), the SIGE 
model presented above makes a few simplifying assumptions, some of which are more common and 
others perhaps more unusual. Each of these presents an opportunity for future work to improve the 
model. I now discuss a few that seem particularly promising. 
First, the model lacks investment and capital accumulation. Whether this absence significantly 
affects the dynamics of the other variables in this class of models is open to debate (Woodford, 2005; 
Sveen and Weinke, 2005), but modelling investment has the benefit of extending the model to 
explain one more macroeconomic variable. The SIGE model omits investment because the behavior 
of inattentive investors accumulating capital has not yet been studied, whereas there is previous 
work on the micro-foundations and implications of inattentiveness on the part of consumers (Reis, 
2006a), price-seting firms (Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Reis, 2006b), and workers (Mankiw and Reis 
2003). Gabaix and Laibson (2002) and Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007) study financial investment 
decisions with inattentiveness, but the step from this work to studying physical investment and 
capital accumulation remains to be taken.  
Second, the model lacks international trade and exchange rates. The reason for this omission is 
the same as for investment: the models of inattentive behavior in international markets are still 
missing. Progress in this area will likely come soon, as Bachetta and van Wincoop (2006) have 
already filled some of the gap. Once this is completed, one can build an open economy SIGE to use for 
economies other than the United States or the euro area. 
Third, the model lacks wealth heterogeneity since it assumes a complete insurance contract with 
which households fully diversify their risks. Most business cycle models make this assumption 
because it makes them more tractable by collapsing the wealth distribution to a single point. 
Relaxing this assumption and numerically computing the equilibria should not be difficult, but it has 
not yet been undertaken. 
With regard to the micro-foundations of inattentiveness, the model assumes that when agents 
pay the cost to obtain new information, they can observe everything. While there is an explicit fixed 
cost of information, the variable cost is zero. This assumption is useful because it allows the model to 
emphasize the decision of when and how often to pay attention, which can then be studied in detail. 
It can easily be relaxed to allow people to observe only some things but not everything when they 
update (see, for example, Carroll and Slacalek, 2006). A harder extension would be to also consider 
the decision of how much to pay attention, by letting people pick which pieces of news to look at 
when they update. Mackowiack and Wiederholt (2007) have made promising progress in this area, 
following Sims (1998), but the models are still not at the point where they can be put in general 
equilibrium and taken to the data.  
One implication of removing the assumption that updating agents learn everything, is that there 
is no longer common knowledge in the economy. This leads to a new source of strategic interactions 
between agents who have different information and know that no one knows everything. Woodford 
(2003a), Hellwig (2002), Amato and Shin (2006), Morris and Shin (2006), and Adam (2007) all study 
some of the implications of this behavior, and recent work by Lorenzoni (2008) moves toward turning 
these insights into a business cycle model that could be taken to the data. Hellwig and Veldkamp 
(2008) study another source of strategic interaction, namely, whether agents coordinate their 
attention times. These extra ingredients promise to enrich future models of inattentiveness. 
The SIGE model ignores another source of strategic interaction. The model assumes that 
consumers have inattentive planners and attentive shoppers, while firms have inattentive sales 
departments and attentive purchasing departments. Consequently, monopolists only face attentive 
agents in every market. This is important because if a monopolist sells its product to some buyers 
that are inattentive, then it will want to exploit their inattentiveness to raise its profits (Gabaix and 
Laibson, 2006). These inattentive buyers would take into account this extra cost of being inattentive 
and alter their choices of when to update their information and how to act when uninformed. The 
equilibrium of this game has not, to my knowledge, been fully studied. 
Overall, the SIGE model ignores many features that could lead to new and interesting insights. 
They were omitted mainly because they are not sufficiently understood to put them into the full 
DSGE setup used in this paper. 
 
3. THE REDUCED-FORM LOG-LINEAR EQUILIBRIUM 
 
The appendix describes how to log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the Pareto-
optimal steady state, where all the random variables are equal to their mean and the tax rates 
ensure that markups are zero. This gives a set of reduced-form relations characterizing the 
equilibrium of the log-linearized values of key aggregate variables (denoted with small letters and a 
t subscript), as a function of parameters and steady-state values (in small letters but no subscript). 
First, summing the production function for the individual firms gives an aggregate relation 
between output (yt), productivity (at), and labor (lt) with decreasing returns to scale at rate β:  
 




t.  (19) 
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  Second, the equilibrium in the goods market leads to a Phillips curve (or aggregate supply) 
linking the price level (pt) to marginal costs and desired markups. Real marginal costs rise with real 
wages (wt – pt), since these are the cost of inputs; they rise with output (yt), as a result of decreasing 
returns to scale; and they fall with productivity (at). Desired markups are lower the higher the 
elasticity of substitution across goods’ varieties ( t ν ), where ν is the steady-state elasticity of 
substitution for goods:  
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Since only a fraction λ of firms update their information and set their plans, current shocks only 
have an immediate impact of λ on prices. 
Third, the equilibrium in the bond market leads to an IS curve (or aggregate demand) relating 
output to three variables: a measure of wealth, namely, 
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future output stimulates current spending; the long real interest rate, defined as 
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t+1+ j), since higher expected interest rates encourage postponing consumption; 
and shocks to government spending (gt), since these subtract from consumption:  
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Every period, only a randomly drawn share δ of consumers update their plan, so the larger the value 
of δ, the more consumption responds to shocks as they occur. 
Fourth, equilibrium in the labor market leads to a wage curve (or labor supply) according to 
which current wages (wt) are higher with higher prices, since workers care about real wages; with 
higher expected real wages, since these push up the demand for a worker’s variety of labor; with 
higher employment, since the marginal disutility of working rises; with higher wealth, since leisure 
is a normal good; with lower interest rates, since the return on savings is lower and the incentive to 
work to save is thus also lower; and with a lower elasticity of substitution across labor varieties, 
since desired markups are then higher:  
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The fraction of up-to-date workers is ω, with the remaining workers setting their wage to what they 
expected would be optimal when they last updated. 
Finally, the policy rule gives the last reduced-form equilibrium relation. In the case of the Taylor 
rule, this relation is  
 











These five equations give the equilibrium values for inflation, nominal interest rates, output 
growth, employment, and real wage growth, xt = {Δpt, it, Δyt, lt, Δ(wt – pt)}, as a function of the five 
exogenous shocks to aggregate productivity growth, aggregate demand, goods markups, labor 
markups, and monetary policy, st = {Δat, gt, νt, γt, εt}. I assume that each of these shocks follows an 
independent stationary stochastic process with (potentially infinite) moving-average representation. 
This assumption allows for a very general representation of the shocks hitting the economy. One  
implication is that there is a stochastic trend in the economy driven by productivity, which seems 
consistent with the data. 
 
4. SOLVING FOR THE EQUILIBRIUM 
 
I first solve for the equilibrium when all are attentive and then solve for the inattentive 
equilibrium under different policy rules. Finally, I derive expressions for the likelihood and social 
welfare functions. 
 
4.1 The Classical Equilibrium 
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where Ξ = βψ/(1 + ψ), under the assumption that θ = 1. Assuming that the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution equals one implies that output moves one-to-one with the nonstationary productivity 
shocks, while hours worked, 






t)/β , are stationary, as seems to be the case in the data. 
In the classical equilibrium, output rises with each of the four real shocks, but it is independent 
of monetary policy shocks and the monetary policy rule. There are no nominal rigidities in this 
classical economy, so the classical dichotomy holds, with real variables being independent of 
monetary shocks. 
Finally, it is important to note that this classical equilibrium is not necessarily optimal. The 
definition of a Pareto optimum is not obvious when there are changes in preferences. However, if the 
shocks to the preferences lead to an inefficiency relative to their steady-state values, then the 
optimal output is 





t , so shocks to the markups leads to inefficient fluctuations even if all 
agents are attentive. 
 
4.2 The Inattentiveness Equilibrium 
 
The solution of the inattentiveness equilibrium is a little more involved. One useful piece of 
notation is to write each variable in terms of its moving-average representation. For instance, for the 
generic shock s  ∈  S = {Δa,  g,  ν,  γ,  ε}, Wold’s theorem implies that there is a representation 




∞ ∑ ˆ s
ne
t−n




s  are independent zero-mean random variables. For the endogenous 
variables that depend on all five shocks, 
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n , where the new coefficients    Ξ(s) follow 
easily from equation (24) and the definitions of Ξ  and 
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n . Another useful piece of notation is to 
denote the share of people that have updated after n periods by 
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The first result gives the first key step in the algorithm to solve the model: 
Proposition 1. Writing the solution for the price level as 
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The proof of this (and all other results) is in the appendix. It implies that given a solution for 
prices, one can easily compute the solution for output. A closely associated result is the following: 
Proposition 2. The moving-average coefficients for the short-term real interest, wages, and hours 
worked as a function of those for prices and output are,  
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With these two propositions and a solution for prices, we have the equilibrium values of all the 
real variables independently of the monetary policy rule. We can therefore focus on solving for prices 
alone. 
If the policy rule is the one proposed by Taylor, then using the Fisher equation, it = rt + Et(Δpt+1), 
and the results in the previous two propositions leads to the solution for the price level: 4 
Proposition 3. If the policy rule is a Taylor rule, 









t, the undetermined 
coefficients for the price level satisfy the second-order difference equation:  
 
   
A
n+1 ˆ p
n+1 s () − B
n ˆ p
n s () +C
n−1 ˆ p
n−1 s () = D
n s ()ˆ s
n for n = 0,1,2,... (32) 
 
where 











n , and 







   
D














n s () −Ξ s () ⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ for s = a,γ,ν
ϒ


















n s () −Ξ s () ⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ for s = g















Solving the difference equation requires two boundary conditions. As the time from the shock 
goes to infinity, all agents become aware of it, so the effect of the shock on the inattentive 
equilibrium is the same as that in the attentive equilibrium. Since the price level converges to a 
constant (nonzero for the technology shocks and zero for the other shocks) regardless of the shock, 
one boundary condition is
   
n→∞ lim ˆ p
n − ˆ p
n−1 () =0. The other boundary condition is 
   
ˆ p
−1 =0. 
I solve the difference equations by writing, separately for each shock, a system of N + 1 equations 
for the N + 1 undetermined coefficients from 
   
ˆ p
0(s) to 
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Because the system has a special tri-diagonal structure, it is numerically easy to solve. I have set N 
at either 100, 500, or 1,000. In almost all cases, both the ignored terms of order above N and the 
change in the first 100 coefficients as N changed were negligible. 
Because the goal of this paper is to provide a model that can be used to study monetary policy, it 
is important to consider alternative policy rules to the Taylor rule. The main alternative to interest-
                                                       
4. Mankiw and Reis (2007) present an initial version of this result, limited to AR(1) shocks. 12 
rate rules are targeting rules (Svensson, 2003). Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2005) show that if only firms 
are inattentive, an elastic price standard is optimal: 
Proposition 4. If policy follows an elastic price-level standard, 























where  () = () ss ΞΞ    for s = a, g; and  () = 0 s Ξ    for s = γ, ν. 
The literature contains many alternative policy rules, and the appendix presents a few more and 
their corresponding solution. Together with the results in this section, this should provide sufficient 
evidence that despite the infinite number of expectations going backward and the lack of a recursive 
representation for the endogenous variables, the SIGE model is still easy to solve.5 
 
4.3 The Likelihood and Welfare Functions 
 
The key input in likelihood-based estimation is the likelihood function. Letting xt denote the 5×1 
column vector with the endogenous variables of the model and et denote the column vector with the 5 
exogenous shocks, the solution in propositions 1 to 4 can be expressed as a set of 5×5 matrices Φn, 
such that 






t−n . The data consists of time-series on xt from t = 1 to t = T for the 
endogenous variables, which can be stacked in a 5T×1 vector X, and the unknown parameters can be 
collected in the vector θ. The likelihood function is then denoted by L(X⏐θ). 




s  are normally distributed with variances 




vector et therefore follows a multivariate normal distribution with diagonal covariance matrix Σ. The 
notation IN denotes an identity matrix of size N and ⊗ for the Kronecker product of two matrices. 
Since the model is linear, X follows a multivariate normal distribution. This leads to the next 
proposition, taken from Mankiw and Reis (2007):  
Proposition 5. Let Ω be the 5T×5N matrix,  
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Mankiw and Reis (2007) note that the large 5T×5T matrix Ω(IN⊗Σ)Ω′ can be inverted either with 
a Choleski decomposition or by choosing N = T to re-express the problem in terms of a system of 
linear equations. Either way, one can evaluate the log-likelihood function quickly and reliably. 
                                                       
5. Building on some of these results, Meyer-Gohde (2007) combines this approach with others in the literature to provide 
a unified user-friendly algorithm that can solve most DSGE models with forward and lagged expectations without requiring 
almost any algebra on the part of the user (unlike the propositions above). His set of programs holds the promise of further 
advancing this literature.  
A natural way to compare the performance of different policy rules is to compute the utility of the 
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Because the model assumes that all households are ex ante identical and there are complete 
insurance markets, it is natural to assume that all households get the same weight in the integral. 
Moreover, because one wants a rule that performs well across circumstances, it makes sense to take 
the ex ante perspective provided by the unconditional expectation that integrates over all possible 
initial conditions. The appendix proves the following result: 
Proposition 6. An approximate formula for the welfare benefits in percentage units of steady-
state consumption of a policy θ(1) starting from a policy θ(0) are 
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Combining this result with those in propositions 1 to 4, it is easy to evaluate this expression and 
compare the performance of different policy rules.  
 
5. ESTIMATING STICKY INFORMATION 
 
Taking sticky information models to the data has been an active field of research. One approach 
is to look for direct evidence of inattentiveness using microeconomic data. Carroll (2003) uses 
surveys of inflation expectations to show that the public’s forecasts lag the forecasts made by 
professionals.6 Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) show that the disagreement in the inflation 
expectations in the survey data have properties consistent with sticky information.7 Reis (2006a) and 
                                                       
6. See also Dopke and others (2008) and Nunes (2006). 
7. Also focussing on disagreement, see Gorodnichenko (2006), Branch (2007), and Rich and Tracy (2006). 14 
Carroll and Slacalek (2006) interpret some of the literature on the sensitivity and smoothness of 
microeconomic consumption data in the light of sticky information, and Klenow and Willis (2007) 
and Knotek (2006) find slow dissemination of information in the microeconomic data on prices. For 
the most part, this literature supports the assumption of sticky information, and the associated 
estimates of the information-updating rates are consistent. 
A second approach is to estimate Phillips curves assuming sticky information on the part of price 
setters only.8 These limited-information approaches typically use data on inflation, output, marginal 
costs, and expectations to estimate simpler versions of equation (20), and the results are typically 
good or mixed. One interesting finding that comes out of many of these studies is that the main 
source of discrepancy between the model and the data is not the inattentiveness or the slow 
dissemination of information, but the assumption that, conditional on their information sets, agents 
form expectations rationally. 
This paper takes a third approach, of estimating the model using full-information techniques 
that exploit the restrictions imposed by general equilibrium. The few papers that attempt this 
exercise typically find either mixed or poor fits between the model and the data.9 Mankiw and Reis 
(2006) explain the contrast between the negative results in some of these papers and the mostly 
positive results found by the other two approaches. They note that the papers in this literature 
assume inattentiveness only in price setting, while assuming that the other agents in the model are 
fully attentive. To fit the data, however, stickiness should be pervasive, and for the internal 
coherence of the model, inattentiveness should apply to all decisions. By assuming attentive 
consumer and workers, the general-equilibrium restrictions imposed in these papers are 
misspecified. 
Allowing for pervasive stickiness, I take a Bayesian approach to deal with the uncertainty, 
starting with a prior joint probability density p(θ) and using the likelihood function L(X⏐θ) to obtain 
the posterior density of the parameters p(θ⏐X). This is done numerically, using Markov chain Monte 
Carlo simulations.10 
The prior density p(θ) follows the convention in the DSGE literature (for example, An and 
Schorfheide, 2007), including assuming that the shocks st follow first order autoregressive, or AR(1), 
processes with coefficients ρs and innovation standard deviations σs. There are twenty parameters in 
the model: θ = {θ, ψ, ν, γ, β, ρΔa, σΔa, ρε, σε, ρg, σg, ρν, σν, ργ, σγ, φp, φy, δ, ω, λ}. Table 1 shows the 
moments of the prior densities. 
Four of the parameters have a tight prior with zero variance: θ, which is set to one to ensure 
stationary hours worked; β, which equals two-thirds to match the labor share in the data; and ρΔa 
and σΔa, since a series for productivity growth follows from the data on output and employment in 
equation (19), so we can recover these parameters by a simple least-squares regression.11 
Each of the remaining sixteen parameters is treated independently and is assigned a particular 
distribution (gamma, beta, or uniform) with a relatively large variance. The mean elasticity of labor 
supply, ψ, is 2 and the elasticities of substitution across goods and labor varieties, ν and γ, are set at 
11, in line with the typical assumptions in the literature. The mean ρs for the four shocks other than 
productivity are set to 0.9, so that the half-life of the shocks is approximately six quarters and the σs 
are set to 0.5, which lies between the two values estimated for σΔa.12 The monetary policy parameters 
are set at φp = 1.24 and φy = 0.33, which are the values estimated by Rudebusch (2002) on U.S. data. 
Finally, the inattentiveness parameters δ, ω, and λ have a flat prior in the unit interval. 
As for the data, I use quarterly observations for two large economies: the United States from 
1986:3 to 2006:1 and the euro area from 1993:4 to 2005:4. I chose these countries because they are 
closer to the closed-economy approximation in the model. The starting dates coincide with the start 
                                                       
8. See Khan and Zhu (2006), Dopke and others (2006), Korenok (2005), Pickering (2004), Coibion (2007), and Molinari 
(2007). 
9. See Trabandt (2007), Andrés, Nelson, and López-Salido (2005), Kiley (2007), Laforte (2007), Korenok and Swanson 
(2005, 2007), and Paustian and Pytlarczyk (2006). 
10. The exact algorithm is described in the appendix. 
11. The values for ρΔa and σΔa are 0.03 and 0.51, respectively, for the United States and 0.66 and 0.28 for the euro area. 
12. For the markups, the value for the standard deviation is multiplied by ten and the elasticities of substitution are 
multiplied by minus one, to counteract the multiplier that is visible in equations (20) and (22).  
of Alan Greenspan’s term as chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in the 
United States and with the signing of the Maastricht treaty that created the European Union and 
started the coordination of monetary policy towards the euro, so they are consistent with assuming a 
stable monetary policy rule. They come after the “great moderation” in economic activity, consistent 
with assuming constant variances of the shocks. 
The data for the United States are seasonally adjusted, refer to the nonfarm business sector, and 
comprise observations on growth in real output per capita, growth in total real compensation per 
hour, hours worked per capita, and inflation. All series are de-meaned; they use the implicit nonfarm 
business price deflator for the price level and for deflating nominal values; and growth rates refer to 
the change in the natural logarithm. The nominal interest rate is the effective Federal funds rate. 
The data for the euro area are the area-wide quarterly dataset that combines data from each 
country’s national accounts to build consistent pseudo-aggregates for the whole region. Inflation is 
the change in the log of the GDP deflator, output growth is the change in log real GDP, and wages 
are measured using total compensation. To obtain variables per capita, I use an interpolated euro 
area population series. The hours data are detrended using a linear trend. 
 
6. ESTIMATES OF THE MODEL 
 
I discuss the estimates for the two regions separately. 
 
6.1 The United States 
 
Table 2 displays summary statistics of the posterior distribution of the parameters. The posterior 
moments for the elasticities of substitution across varieties are close to the prior assumptions from 
the literature. The elasticity of labor supply is quite large, but still in line with typical assumptions 
in the business cycle literature. As for the shocks, the aggregate demand disturbances are very 
persistent and quite volatile, so one can already guess that they are playing an important part in the 
volatility of the economy. 
The more interesting estimates are those of the inattentiveness parameters, on which the prior 
had less information. Firms are estimated to be inattentive for six months, on average, which is 
slightly more attentive than what was found in the studies described in the previous section. 
Consumers are very inattentive, updating their information once every three years, on average. This 
is not too shocking considering that fixed costs of planning of less than $100 per household can easily 
generate this length of inattentiveness. Moreover, between 20 percent and 50 percent of the U.S. 
population lives hand-to-mouth, which is equivalent to being inattentive forever (Reis, 2006a). 
The more surprising estimate in the table is the inattention of workers, who update their 
information very often, on average once every four months. One possible explanation for this result is 
that the data series used for wages measured total compensation, a large fraction of which is 
accounted for by nonwage payments. It is conceivable that the many dimensions of an employee’s 
compensation may actually be updated to include new information quite often, even if the wage 
component of this compensation is not. Preliminary calculations using a wage series find more 
inattentive workers, and workers are also more inattentive in the euro area, where nonwage 
compensation is less important. 
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of four variables (namely, inflation, nominal interest rates, 
hours worked, and the output gap) to one-standard-deviation impulses to the five shocks. The most 
surprising finding is perhaps the quick response of inflation to monetary policy shocks. The 
conventional wisdom from studies using postwar U.S. data is that this response should be delayed 
and hump shaped. As recent studies have shown, however, inflation responds much faster to 
monetary policy after 1980, which some researchers attribute to changes in monetary policy.13 From 
the perspective of the SIGE model, inflation responds quickly to monetary policy because monetary 
policy shocks are quite short-lived. When policy changes, the SIGE model predicts a change in the 
                                                       
13. See Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and the references therein.  16 
dynamics of the model that matches the data, surviving the Lucas critique in a way that pricing 
models that always produce a hump shape do not. 
Table 3 presents the predicted variance decompositions at different horizons. Monetary policy 
shocks play a small role in the variance of most macroeconomic variables in the United States after 
1986, with the exception of the nominal interest rate and wages. Productivity shocks are important 
for real wages at all horizons and for hours worked at short horizons, while aggregate demand 
shocks explain much of the variability of output growth and hours worked.14 Finally, inflation is 
significantly driven by the markup shocks. 
 
6.2 The Euro Area  
 
Table 4 shows moments from the posterior distribution for the euro area. Relative to the U.S. 
estimates, there are two differences. First, the estimated average markups are larger for the euro 
area than for the United States. Second, the elasticity of labor supply is somewhat smaller, although 
it is still large compared with typical estimates based on microeconomic data. The inattentiveness of 
European firms is similar to that of American firms, while consumers are more attentive and 
workers less attentive. This brings the two members of the household in line, with both updating 
every nine to fifteen months, on average. 
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to shocks in the euro area. The response of inflation to a 
monetary shock is now slightly hump shaped, but it peaks just two quarters after the shock. 
Moreover, the response of all variables to a monetary shock is more delayed than in the United 
States. 
As was the case for the United States, a positive productivity shocks raises total output but 
lowers hours worked and the output gap on impact, consistent with the evidence in Galí (2004). 
Because many firms initially do not know about the shock, they do not raise their output as much as 
they would with full information. Likewise, an increase in the elasticities of substitution (that is, a 
positive markup shock) raises hours worked and output, but leads to a negative output gap, because 
the expansion is smaller than would be the case with full information. Aggregate demand shocks 
boost inflation and the output gap and thus raise nominal interest rates, via the Taylor rule. 
Table 5 has the variance decompositions for the euro area. Monetary policy shocks play a 
significantly larger role in explaining the variability of output growth and hours worked than they 
did in the United States, while productivity shocks are also more important drivers of output and 
inflation. Aggregate demand shocks are still important in explaining output and hours worked, as 
are markup shocks for inflation. 
 
 
7. ROBUSTNESS OF THE ESTIMATES 
 
This section summarizes the impact of several changes to the specification choices on the 
posterior estimates. Starting with the priors, I attempted a few variations from the baseline in table 
1. Because fully characterizing the posterior distributions is computationally time consuming, I 
focused only on their modes. The three experiments were as follows: raising the prior mean for the 
elasticity of labor supply from 2 to 4; lowering the prior mean correlation of the shocks from 0.9 to 
0.5; and setting the prior standard deviation of the shocks equal to σΔa in each region, rather than to 
the 0.5 in-between value. Each of these changes had a negligible difference in the mode of the 
posterior distribution. 
With regard to the policy rule, an alternative to the Taylor rule in equation (23) with serially 
correlated shocks is an inertial rule: 
 
                                                       
14. Of all the model’s shocks, these aggregate demand shocks are closest to the shocks to the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure that Hall (1997) argues account for most of the U.S. business cycle.  













where the εt are serially uncorrelated. I estimated this alternative model and obtained a mean 
posterior estimate for ρi of 0.25 for the United States and 0.16 for the euro area. In terms of overall 
fit to the data, the results are mixed. For the United States, the marginal density for the inertial rule 
is higher, whereas for the euro area, the Taylor rule with correlated shocks dominates. 
In terms of the data, the main issue to address is a clear upward trend in hours worked in the 
euro area, associated with the slow decline in European unemployment. In the main results, I dealt 
with it by removing a linear trend from the data. Using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter led to the 
same results. There is no trend in the U.S. data, so detrending it with the HP filter or even not 
detrending it at all led to almost indistinguishable data series. 
Finally, for the sample periods, Mankiw and Reis (2007) estimate a subset of the parameters 
using postwar U. S. data. Relative to the results in table 2, they find that workers and consumers 
update their information every five to six quarters, on average, which is close to the euro area 
estimates in this paper. They also find much more persistent and volatile monetary policy shocks, 
such that monetary shocks account for a large share of the volatility of the macroeconomic series. 
One conjecture for what is behind this discrepancy is that including the high inflation of the 1970s in 
the sample requires large monetary policy shocks that play a large role in the business cycle. 
 
8. POLICY QUESTIONS 
 
To begin applying the two estimated models to policy analysis, I explore some questions about 
monetary policy. 
 
8.1 What Rule Has Best Described Policy? 
 
An extensive literature, starting with Taylor (1993), documents that the policy rule in equation 
(23) provides a good description of policy in the United States and a reasonable description of policy 
in the euro area. Within this common rule, there is room for differences between the two regions in 
the parameters of the rule. 
According to the estimates in tables 2 and 4, monetary policy has been quite similar in the 
United States post-1986 and in the euro area post-1993, especially in only modestly responding to 
real activity. The estimates of φp and φy are somewhat lower than the typical result in the literature, 
but the more surprising posterior mean is the low persistence of monetary policy shocks, especially 
in the United States. 
As noted in section 5, the estimated quick response of most macroeconomic variables to monetary 
policy shocks is linked to these low estimates of persistence. Figure 3 backs this claim by comparing 
the impulse responses in the status quo with the responses to raising the persistence of monetary 
shocks from the posterior means to the prior mean of 0.9. This change reestablishes the conventional 
delayed hump-shaped responses found in the literature on the post-war United States (Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999).15 
 
8.2 What Is the Role of Policy Announcements? 
 
The past decade has seen an increasing emphasis on transparency in central banking. Part of the 
argument for transparency is that if the central bank acts predictably, it will reduce confusion and 
mistakes on the part of private decisionmakers. According to this point of view, if policy shocks must 
take place, then they should be announced in advance and clearly communicated to the general 
public. In the context of the SIGE model, this calls for announcing monetary policy shocks a few 
                                                       
15. Coibion (2006) first pointed out the role of the persistence of interest rate shocks in delivering hump shapes. 18 
quarters in advance, so that a large fraction of agents have time to learn of the event in the interim 
between announcement and action. 
Figure 4 shows the results of announcing a monetary policy shock one or two years ahead in the 
United States and the euro area. The exercise here consists of learning at date t = 0 the value of the 
monetary shock to occur at dates t = 4 or t = 8. The announcement is therefore still a shock in the 
sense of a deviation from the policy rule. The figure reveals that inflation and nominal interest rates 
move even before the shock materializes because forward-looking agents react instantly to the news 
of a future shock. The agents that update their information learn about the shocks before it happens 
and adjust their actions in response. In both regions, announcements lower the initial impact of 
monetary policy shocks on hours worked and the output gap, while significantly increasing the 
overall impact on inflation. 
 
8.3 What Is the Result of Having Interest Rates Move Gradually? 
 
As described by Bernanke (2004), the FOMC tends to change interest rates gradually. Academic 
arguments in favor of such actions typically involve financial stability, the gradual revelation of 
news, or the desire to move long-term interest rates. Woodford (2003c) notes that in forward-looking 
models like SIGE, gradualism involves combining policy responses with announcements of future 
policy changes. 
Figure 5 compares three different patterns of shocks for the two regions. In the first case, there is 
a one-standard-deviation shock to interest rates at date 0. In the second case, there are four 
consecutive shocks, each of size σε/4 and each coming as a surprise to the agents. In the third 
scenario, the sequence of four shocks is announced at date 0. The results indicate that an anticipated 
gradual cut in interest rates has a much stronger impact than an expected cut of the same size. If 
the gradual cut is unexpected, however, the impact is actually smaller. Therefore, gradual policy 
changes can be quite effective according to the SIGE model, but only if they are announced and 
credible. 
 
8.4 How Would Taylor’s Proposal Compare? 
 
Taylor (1993) originally suggested that the interest rate responses to inflation and output should 
be 1.5 and 0.5, respectively. Figure 6 compares this rule with the one estimated here for the impulse 
responses of inflation and hours worked to productivity and aggregate demand shocks. For both 
shocks and both regions, Taylor’s more aggressive policy rule leads to a smaller response in the 
output gap to the shock. The unconditional variance of hours worked would fall by 1.3 percent (2.7 
percent) if the United States (euro area) moved to this rule, and welfare would be 4 (6) basis points of 
steady-state consumption higher. 
 
8.5 How Does a Price-Level Target Compare? 
 
Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2005) show that in an economy with inattentive firms, the optimal policy 
is an “elastic price standard” that keeps the price level close to a deterministic target Kt, allowing for 
deviations of the price level from the target in response to deviations of output from the Pareto-
optimal level: 
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Under this rule, positive deviations of inflation from the target are not bygones, but must be 
accompanied by future negative deviations to revert the price level back to target. 
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses to productivity and aggregate demand shocks of having a 
strict rule with φ = 0. In the United States, fully stabilizing inflation has little impact on the 
response of hours worked. The response of hours worked to the markup shocks (not reported)  
becomes significantly more pronounced, though, so the rule has a negative effect on welfare of 4 basis 
points on impact. For the euro area, the welfare loss from this rule would be a substantial 17 basis 
points. 
Figure 8 graphs the responses to an elastic rule, where φ is set following the guidelines of Ball, 
Mankiw, and Reis (2005).16 The φ for the United States is 0.12, while that for the euro area is 3.08. 




The aim of this paper was to build one particular model of the macroeconomy that can be used to 
give systematic policy advice. The two guiding principles behind the construction of the model were, 
first, that inattentiveness is a feature of behavior that affects all markets and decisions and, second, 
that it is the only feature that leads to a deviation from an otherwise classical equilibrium. In 
reality, many frictions are probably at play, but insisting on a single friction allows one to explore 
how far inattentiveness alone affects macroeconomic dynamics and policy, while staying within a 
coherent theoretical framework where in which all details are explicitly stated. 
Many of the details of the model, as well as the way in which the parameters were picked, may 
be open to debate, and there is room for disagreement on how well the model fits the data. I have 
tried throughout the paper to highlight the theoretical gaps in the model, the different views on how 
to set its parameters, and the ways in which it succeeded and failed at explaining the data. In the 
model’s defense, it did not seem to perform noticeably worse than some popular alternatives, like the 
models in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2006), 
or Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). 
While the model’s performance is probably still far from the level of success one should demand 
to confidently give precise policy recommendations, the exercise did provide some policy lessons. 
First, the persistence of monetary policy shocks has been low, and this is a crucial determinant of the 
speed at which inflation and output respond to these shocks. Second, announcements and 
gradualism, through their effects on the expectations of forward-looking agents, can have a large 
impact on the effects of monetary policy. Third, Taylor’s suggested policy rule parameters would lead 
to better outcomes than the status quo, while an elastic price standard has a disappointing 
performance when inattentiveness is pervasive. 
 
                                                       
16. More concretely, Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2005) show that the optimal φ is the inverse of the product of (1 + ψ)/(1 + ψν) 
and the relative weight of relative-price distortions and output-gap fluctuations in the policymaker’s objective function. I 
approximate this relative weight by the ratio of the change in the volatility of the output gap and the change in the volatillity 




A1. Inattentive Actions  
 
Planner-savers, who every period face a probability δ of revising their plans, have a value 
function V(Mt) conditional on date t being a planning date. They choose a plan for current and future 
consumption all the way into infinity {Ct+l,l}l=0
∞  since with a vanishingly small probability they may 
never update again:  
 




































subject to the sequence of budget constraints in equation (9) and a no-Ponzi condition. 
The optimality conditions are  
 























++ ++ ′′ ⎡⎤ ξδ ξ − δ Π ⎣⎦ ∑  (47) 
 
where 




∏  is the the compound return between t + l and t + 1 + k for k > l. Now, for 
l =  0 ,  t h e  r i g h t - h a n d  s i d e  o f  e q u a t i o n  ( 4 6 )  i s  t h e  s a m e  a s  t h e  r i g h t - h a n d  s i d e  o f  e q u a t i o n  ( 4 7 ) .  
Therefore,  ( )
1/
,0 tt CV M
−θ ′ = , or the marginal utility of an extra unit of consumption equals the 
marginal value of an extra unit of wealth. Using this result to replace the V′(Mt+1+l) terms in 
equation (47) and writing the equation recursively gives the Euler equation in equation (10). The 
second Euler equation in equation (11) then follows. 
The workers face a similar problem: 
 















































subject to the sequence of budget constraints in equation (9), a no-Ponzi scheme condition, and the 
demand for the variety of labor j in equation (14), which each worker supplies monopolistically. The 
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Now, as in the consumer problem, combining equation (49) for l = 0 with equation (50) leads to 
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This expression shows that ψ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply for attentive agents and that the 
marginal disutility of working is equated to the real wage rate times the marginal value of wealth 
times a markup taking into account the elasticity of demand for the good. Using it in the optimality 
condition leads to the two Euler equations in equations (16) and (17). 
 
A2. The Log-Linear Equilibrium for the Full Model  
 
At the nonstochastic steady state, the five exogenous processes are constant. Using the 
conditions defining the optimum, it follows that output is Y = AL
β, consumption is C = Y/G, and labor 
is  
 
   
κL
1+1/ψ =






I log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around this point. Small caps denote the log-deviations 







t , which are the log-deviations of  t ν    and  t γ   ; 
 
r
t , which is the log-deviation of the short rate 






t , which is the log-deviation of the long rate 




Starting with the goods market, log-linearizing the demand for good j by combining equations (3) 
and (6) gives  
 





t () .  (53) 
 
The production function (5) and the firm’s optimality condition (7) become  
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Turning to the bond market, the consumer’s Euler equations in equations (10) and (11) become 
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Next, in the labor market, the demand for a labor variety in equation (14), together with the 
market clearing condition in this market, leads to:  
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and the optimality conditions in the workers’ problem become  
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Finally, the static price indices and aggregate quantity are  
 








t,i,  (61) 
 





















t,j.  (63) 
 
These eleven equations over time characterize the equilibrium solution for the set of twelve 
variables (yt,i, yt, ct,0, ct,j, lt,0, lt,k, lt, wt,k, wt, pt, pt,i, rt) as a function of the five exogenous processes (Δat, 
gt, γt, νt, εt). There is one equation missing, namely, the policy rule in equation (23). 
 
A3. The Reduced-Form Aggregate Relations  
 
Integrating equation (54) over i gives the aggregate production function in equation (19). 
For the Phillips curve, starting with equation (61), replace yt,j using equation (53) and pt,i using 
equation (55). Rearrange to obtain equation (20). 
Moving to the IS curve, iterate equation (56) forward and take the limit as time goes to infinity. 
Then, the facts that there is complete insurance and that eventually all agents become aware of the 
shocks imply that 
   
τ→∞ lim E
t c
t+τ,0 () = τ→∞ lim E
t y
t+τ ( )≡ y
t
∞. Using the definition of the long rate Rt and 
replacing for ct,0 in equations (57) and (63) gives an expression for output. Using the fact that 
   
τ→∞ lim E
t g
t+τ ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ =0 gives the IS curve in equation (21).  
Finally, for the wage curve, take very similar steps as in the IS curve: iterate equation (59) 
forward and use the solution to replace wt,0 in equation (60). Combining the wt,j in the aggregator for 
wt in equation (62) and replacing out lt,j using equation (58) gives the wage curve in equation (22). 
 
A4. Proof of Propositions 1 and 2  
 
Take the case of s = a. By a method of undetermined coefficients, equations (19) through (22) 
imply17  
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Rearranging the first three equations immediately proves proposition 2. Using the first two 
expressions to replace 
   
ˆ l
n  and 
   
ˆ w
n in the fourth expression proves proposition 1. The case of the other 
four shocks follows along the same lines. 
 
A5. Proof of Proposition 3  
 
Taking again the case s = a, combining the Taylor rule with the Fisher equation, and again 
omitting the (s) arguments, the undetermined coefficients are  
 
   
ˆ r
n + ˆ p
n+1 − ˆ p
n = φ
p ˆ p





n () . 
 
Using the results in propositions 1 and 2 to replace 
   
ˆ r
n  and 
   
ˆ y
n  and rearranging delivers the 
proposition. The other cases are similar. 
 
A6. Proof of Proposition 4  
 
Since the Kt is known to all agents, real variables are neutral with respect to it, and it only 
induces a deterministic component in prices. Focusing on the stochastic component, in terms of 
moving-average coefficients, the policy rule implies that  
 
( ) ˆˆˆ =. nn n n pys φ− Ξ    
 
Using the expression in proposition 1 to replace 
   
ˆ y
n  delivers the result. 
                                                       
17. I have omitted the (s) arguments to save space.  24 
 
A7. Solutions for Other Interest Rate Rules  
 
The proofs for the case of these rules follow along the same lines as propositions 3 and 4 so they 
are omitted. First, consider alternative interest rate rules: 
Proposition 7. If policy follows the interest rate rules below, the undetermined coefficients for the 
price level satisfy the following second-order difference equation:  
 
   
A
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n+1 s () − B
n ˆ p
n s () +C
n−1 ˆ p
n−1 s () = D
n s () for n = 0,1,2,... (68) 
 
with 




n  and 
   
D
n(ε)=−1  for all cases. The remaining coefficients are as follows: 
 
—For the employment rule,  = tp ty t ip l φΔ + φ , 
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—For the speed-limit rule, 
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—For the inertial rule, 
























0 s () , (73) 
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—For the wage-inflation rule
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Finally, consider alternative price-targeting rules, 
Proposition 8. If the policy rule follows other price-level standards, the undetermined coefficients 
for the price level are as follows: 
 
—With an employment rule, pt = Kt – φlt,  
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for n = 0, 1, 2,….  
 
—With a speed-limit rule, 
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for n = 0, 1, 2,… and with 




—With an inertial rule, 








t−1 ,  
 
   
1+φ Ψ
n () ˆ p
n s () −φ
p ˆ p
n−1 s ()= φΞs () −ϒ






for n = 0, 1, 2,… and with 




—With a wage-targeting rule, 
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for n = 0, 1, 2,…. 
 
A8. Proof of Proposition 5  
 
Since Xt is a sum of multivariate normal distributions it is also multivariate normal. Its mean is 
a column vector of zeros, and its variance-covariance matrix is Ω(IN⊗Σ)Ω′. Using the formula for the 
density of a multivariate normal, the result in the proposition follows immediately. 
 
A9. Proof of Proposition 6 
 
Taking the unconditional expectation through the arguments of expression (38), the goal is to 
maximize the folowing expression:  
 
   
0
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With the definition of the log-linearized values, ct,j = ln(Ct,j) – ln(C) and lt,j = ln(Lt,j) – ln(L), this 
becomes  
 
   



























Recall that the model assumed that the tax on prices exactly offsets the monopoly distortion in 
the goods market: 1 – τp = ν/(ν – 1); the tax on wages exactly offsets the monopoly distortion in the 
goods market: 1 – τw = γ/(γ – 1); and the distortion from government spending is, on average, zero: G 
= 1. In this case, the nonstochastic steady state is an efficient equilibrium without uncertainty. 
These assumptions lead to focusing monetary policy on the task of stabilizing economic activity 
(Woodford, 2003b). From equation (52), they imply that    κL
1+1/ψ = β . 
In the log-linear solution of the model, both ct,j and lt,j are normal variables with a zero mean. 
Therefore, social welfare is  
 28 
   
























Because lt,j is a normal variable, var(lt,j) is a linear function of the variance of the exogenous shocks. 
These are small in the data, so approximating exp[var(lt,j)] by 1 + var(lt,j) involves little numerical 
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Using the distribution of workers according to when they last updated, this becomes  
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Next, combining equation (58) with equations (59) and (60) to replace wt,0 gives the following 
expressions:  
 























Using a method of undetermined coefficients, make the guess that 
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s  and solve to find the expressions in equations (41) and (42). 
From this, it follows that  
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Finally, some grouping shows that  
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where 




n ∑ (1 −ω)
i . Ignoring the terms that are invariant to policy changes, the social 
welfare function then becomes the expression in equation (40). To evaluate the welfare benefit in 
percentage units of steady-state consumption of a policy that implies θ(1) starting from another that 
implies θ(0), use equation (87) to obtain equation (39). 
  
A10. MCMC Algorithm 
 
I used a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to draw from the posterior. In the first step, I looked for 
the mode of the posterior distribution by using line-search and Newton-Raphson algorithms starting 
from twenty different points on the parameter space (chosen from previous estimates of similar 
models and from drawing randomly from either the prior or a uniform on the parameter space). In 
the second step, I used a mixture of normal approximations around the highest local maxima found, 
to obtain an approximation of the posterior. This is then used as the proposal function for the 
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. In the third step, I took a few sequences of 2,000 draws, scaling the 
variance-covariance matrix of the proposal function by different values, until the acceptance rates of 
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm are 10–20 percent. 
In the fourth step, I took 5 independent sequences of 200,000 draws, discarding the first 100,000. 
Inspecting the 500,000 mixed draws made clear that the algorithm was far from converging, and 
that the normal approximation of the posterior was poor. I therefore revised the proposal function to 
a normal distribution with a variance-covariance matrix equal to the scaled estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix of the existing 500,000 draws. 
In the fifth step, I took five independent sequences of 1,000,000 draws, discarding the first 
100,000 draws and keeping only every tenth draw to save on memory space. The Brooks-Gelman 
scale reduction factors and the plots of the between-chain and within-chain variances indicated that 
the results were satisfactory in terms of convergence, so I proceeded to mix them to obtain the final 
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Table 1. Prior Distribution 
       Percentile 
Parameter Densitya Mean 
Standard 
deviation    2.5 50.0  97.5 
Preferences            
ν  1 + G 11  3.16    5.80 10.67  18.08 
γ  1 + G 11  3.16    5.80 10.67  18.08 
ψ  G  2 2.00    0.05 1.39 7.38 
Nonpolicy shocks             
ρg  B  0.90 0.20    0.23 0.99 1.00 
σg  G-1/2 0.50  0.24    0.21 0.39 1.02 
ρν  B  0.90 0.20    0.23 0.99 1.00 
σν  G-1/2 0.50  0.24    0.21 0.39 1.02 
ργ  B  0.90 0.20    0.23 0.99 1.00 
σγ  G-1/2 0.50  0.24    0.21 0.39 1.02 
Monetary policy             
φp  1 + G 1.24  0.25    1.00 1.16 1.92 
φy  G  0.33 0.25    0.03 0.27 0.97 
ρε  B  0.90 0.22    0.23 0.99 1.00 
σε  G-1/2 0.50  0.11    0.21 0.39 1.02 
Inattentiveness            
δ  U  0.50 0.29    0.03 0.50 0.98 
ω  U  0.50 0.29    0.03 0.50 0.98 
λ  U  0.50 0.29    0.03 0.50 0.98 




Table 2. Posterior Distribution for the United Statesa 
     Percentile 
Parameter Mean 
Standard 
deviation    2.5 50.0  97.5 
Preferences          
ν  10.09 2.67    5.83 9.75  15.93 
γ  9.09 2.64    4.74 8.83  14.63 
ψ  5.15 2.52    1.18 4.94  10.95 
Nonpolicy shocks           
ρg  0.99 0.01    0.98 1.00 1.00 
σg  0.83 0.16    0.59 0.81 1.23 
ρν  0.28 0.10    0.08 0.28 0.48 
σν  0.11 0.06    0.03 0.09 0.26 
ργ  0.86 0.08    0.71 0.85 1.00 
σγ  0.12 0.06    0.05 0.11 0.27 
Monetary policy           
φp  1.17 0.16    1.01 1.12 1.60 
φy  0.06 0.03    0.01 0.06 0.14 
ρε  0.29 0.12    0.07 0.30 0.52 
σε  0.44 0.09    0.30 0.43 0.65 
Inattentiveness          
δ  0.08 0.03    0.03 0.08 0.16 
ω  0.74 0.17    0.34 0.78 0.98 
λ  0.52 0.17    0.28 0.48 0.94 
a. All numbers are based on 450,000 draws from the posterior. 
  





































































































































Figure 3. Impulse Response Functions to a More Persistent Monetary Shock 
 









































































































Figure 4. Impulse Response Functions to Policy Announcements 
 























































































































Figure 5. Impulse Response Functions to Gradual Movements in Policy 
 


































































































































Figure 6. Impulse Response Functions with a Taylor Rule 
 


























































































Figure 7. Impulse Response Functions with a Strict Price-Level Target 
 
































































































Figure 8. Impulse Response Functions with an Elastic Price-Level Target 
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